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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in the early 1970s, the world of entrepreneurship exper-
ienced profound change. An innovative investment vehicle—profession-
ally managed venture capital—entered the market.  Personal taxation
rates were reduced; the Nasdaq market was established to raise equity and
trade stocks in pre-profit companies; and in 1978, the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) was amended so that corporate pen-
sion funds could participate in venture investment.1 Throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, various groups lobbied state and federal government to im-
prove the environment for startup and early-stage ventures, and the ven-
ture capital community rallied for changes that would promote investment
in venture funding.2 Changes in the regulation and taxation of financial
institutions further spurred the field of venture capital and led to the
largely venture capital-funded high-tech boom of the 1990s.
The startup investment success that was achieved in that era has not
been replicated with respect to social enterprise. There is still no univer-
sally accepted definition for social enterprises, also referred to as blended
enterprises,3 but the term is widely understood to encompass ventures
* The author is a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School (2013). Special
thanks to Professor Vikramaditya S. Khanna for his guidance and the Michigan Journal of
Private Equity & Venture Capital Law staff for their editorial assistance in connection with
this Note.
1. Ronald Cohen, Impact Capital is the New Venture Capital (Part II), REUTERS (July
13, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/tag/venture-capital.
2. Id.
3. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission Dilemma, 35
VT. L. REV. 105, 105 (2010).
257
258 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 3:257
having an underlying mission dedicated to generating social or environ-
mental gains, rather than solely financial return. For the purposes of this
note, social enterprise will be defined as it is by the Social Enterprise Alli-
ance:4 as an organization or venture that achieves its primary social or
environmental mission via business methods, though the entity itself may
be a nonprofit, for-profit, or hybrid.5 As social enterprise is a steadily
growing field, various academics have noted the need for increased aca-
demic inquiry into theory and practices underlying the field, particularly as
compared to more traditional forms of commercial entrepreneurship.6 For
example, comparable tax incentives must be provided and our regulatory
system should be amended to better support such mission-driven en-
trepreneurial ventures,7 much the same way such systemic changes have
provided the opportunity for profit-driven startups to thrive.
The objectives of this Note are: 1) to provide readers interested in so-
cial enterprise and entrepreneurship an introduction to these endeavors
and the growing trend toward using them; 2) to present the challenges
stemming from the legal and financial frameworks surrounding social in-
vestment activity, which can inhibit the survival and growth of social enter-
prises; and 3) to propose suggestions for addressing such challenges and
limitations in order to better support the survival of social enterprise. Part
II and Part III provide a broad perspective of the types of investment in
and nurturing of social entrepreneurship in the U.S. Part IV analyzes the
current business and regulatory framework supporting entrepreneurial
ventures and provides suggestions to improve their potential to facilitate
sustainable growth of social entrepreneurship.
II. DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The term “disruptive innovation” refers to innovations that are intro-
duced to the marketplace not merely to meet consumers’ existing needs,
but rather to better serve the public.8 These innovations seek to displace
the current, traditional technologies or services available and result in
meaningful social changes, such as expanding different demographics’ ac-
cess to certain goods and services.9 Successful disruptive innovations, such
as cell phones, personal computers, and cheaper, no-frills air travel options
for non-business travelers, have changed the course of business and the
4. The Social Enterprise Alliance is an advocate of the field dedicated to building the
social enterprise community.
5. Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59,
59 (2010).
6. James Austin et al., Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, Different, or
Both?, ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC., Jan. 2006, at 1.
7. Cohen, supra note 1.
8. Clayton Christensen, Disruptive Innovation for Social Change, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Dec. 2006, at 94.
9. Id.
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nature of the various industries into which they have been launched. In the
past few decades, such disruptive innovations, often presenting the poten-
tial for large financial returns, have been funded by venture capitalists and
other big players.10
Disruptive innovations are becoming an increasingly common charac-
teristic of social entrepreneurial endeavors,11 which typically involve the
launch of new goods or services for a target population but are anchored
by their social missions. Social enterprises often attempt to address some
kind of market failure, environmental ill, or distributional inequality in
society.12 For example, a for-profit social enterprise may attempt to in-
crease the supply of a certain public good, which might then improve the
welfare of an economically disadvantaged population or community that
constitutes a “charitable class.”13 Social entrepreneurs undertake to estab-
lish organizations that embody their social missions, or existing organiza-
tions may be influenced by socially-minded individuals within them to shift
business practices toward achieving sustainable social or environmental
benefits. The steady trend of disruptive techniques and technologies and
social enterprise efforts highlights the importance of recognizing the
causal factors facilitating the survival and growth of disruptive innovation
in various industries.
Since social enterprises can take on a variety of different organiza-
tional and legal forms, their funding and investment tend to come from a
variety of sectors and financing models. For example, many social enter-
prises tend to be nonprofit or hybrid entities, rather than traditional for-
profits, and are thus not very attractive to venture capital or institutional
investment.14 Because different sources of funding often lead to disparities
in enterprises’ potential for sustainability, the legal entities and structures
of the organizations in question must necessarily be examined.
Due to the nature of their resources and funding streams, social enter-
prises, particularly nonprofits, can have tremendous difficulty scaling.15
Massive inefficiencies in capital allocation16 in the social sector are re-
flected in social organizations’ failure to survive, due in part to donors’
typical refusals to help entrepreneurs cover overhead costs. This refusal
10. Igor Sill, Maximizing Venture Capital Investments, RED HERRING (May 1, 2012),
http://www.redherring.com/startups/maximizing-venture-capital-investments/ (discussing how
many of the most recent disruptive and innovative companies were funded by venture
capitalists).
11. This note will not explore the different existing definitions for social entrepreneur-
ship and social enterprise; here, these concepts shall be used interchangeably.
12. Katz & Page, supra note 5, at 89.
13. Id.
14. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84
TUL. L. REV. 337, 354 (2009).
15. Ronald Cohen & William A. Sahlman, Social Impact Investing Will Be the New
Venture Capital, HARV. BUS. REV.  HBR BLOG NETWORK (Jan. 17, 2013, 8:00 AM), blogs
.hbr.org/cs/2013/01/social_impact_investing_will_b.html.
16. Id.
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keeps organizations in a perpetual state of fundraising just to maintain
their operations, rather than to scale.17 The U.K.’s Social Investment Task
Force, through its study of social sector organizations, found that almost
all such entrepreneurial organizations are continually underfunded and
possess as little as three months’ working capital at any given time.18
While this may seem similar to the plight of startups, generally, social sec-
tor organizations experience the further disadvantage of being largely ig-
nored by the venture capital industry and other traditional investors, like
banks. Such investors view the social component of entrepreneurial ven-
tures as a discount on their potential return on investment.19 Where there
is some sort of financial cost associated with the business’ social compo-
nent, investment in such enterprises is often viewed even more unfavora-
bly by these traditional investors.20 For-profit social enterprises do not
easily circumvent funding difficulties either, as they cannot obtain funding
from foundations- and donation-based funding and grants that nonprofits
typically receive.
III. CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE CURRENT REGULATORY/
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FRAMEWORK AND
POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
A. Venture Capital and ‘Traditional’ Funding for Startups—
Social Enterprises are Left Behind
Venture capital (VC) is a type of financing often provided in the form
of unsecured capital by angel investors or venture capital funds to young
entrepreneurial businesses.21 As many startups typically lack equity and
significant financial resources, they are not very attractive to banks or
other traditional lenders.22 Such entrepreneurial ventures often also have
difficulty securing capital from traditional sources of investment due to
factors such as their size, stage of development, assets, or revenue poten-
tial. However, regardless of the developmental stage of such startups, if
they exhibit potential for rapid growth and revenue generation, venture
capitalists (VCs) may be intrigued enough to consider investment. Young
entrepreneurial ventures thus hope to secure venture capital as a means of
gaining the equity needed to embark on a path toward long-term growth
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Olivia Khalili, 15 Social Venture Capital Firms You Should Know About, CAUSE
CAPITALISM (Apr. 21, 2010, 2:06 PM), http://causecapitalism.com/15-social-venture-capital-
firms-that-you-should-know-about.
20. Id.
21. Venture Capital, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/venture-
capital-startups-high-growth-technology-companies (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
22. Brent Beshore, The Non-Entrepreneur’s Guide to Startup Funding, FORBES (Feb.
19, 2013, 10:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brentbeshore/2013/02/19/the-non-entrepre
neurs-guide-to-startup-funding/ (banks are a poor source of funding because they are both
highly regulated and require collateral from the recipient).
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and, in doing so, become more attractive to financial lenders and later-
stage investors.23
Because early-stage startups present higher risk to investors, VCs
choosing to invest in them typically take an active role in such companies,
whether by advising on business decisions or sitting on the board of direc-
tors.24 In this vein, venture capital investing tends to be long-term, ena-
bling investors to add both value and capital to startups in order to help
facilitate long-term growth and a higher return on initial VC investment.25
With this focus on longer-term return on investment, rather than just
quick turnaround, VC investors typically only invest in startups they be-
lieve can eventually generate significant profit.
Complicating the dynamic between startup needs and investor inter-
ests, vast informational disparities26 exist in the field of venture capital,
particularly between passive investors, active investors and venture funds,
and VC recipients. This is largely due to varying levels of monitoring exer-
cised by the different parties. Venture funds and angel investors often take
a much more active role in the progress of the startups in which they in-
vest, whereas passive investors have less incentive to monitor closely and
so do not. The legal environment has addressed the potential risks arising
from such informational asymmetries by creating “contractual governance
and incentive techniques,” which are believed to effectively limit opportu-
nism and thereby control the level of risk for investors.27 For example,
fund managers are frequently required to commit capital to target star-
tups. Contractual techniques such as compensation arrangements between
fund managers and investors can also help to align interests.28
The duration of a venture fund is typically ten years with a five-year
investment period, enabling investors to reasonably estimate the period of
time in which the fund can make new investments and when it can begin to
recover its investment and profits earned.29 Clawback provisions, which
are triggered if fund managers receive a greater amount of carried interest
during a startup’s early stages than they should, based on what the com-
pensation agreement entitles them to in later stages, are a source of pro-
tection for fund investors.30
Negotiable contractual elements of a VC fund’s legal form, which are
often flexible business forms such as limited partnerships, may also pro-
vide investors with faith in the alignment of fund managers’ interests and
23. Venture Capital, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Erik P. M. Vermeulen & Diogo Pereira Dias Nunes, The Evolution and Regulation
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the security of their investments. For example, profit distribution arrange-
ments can keep fund managers’ compensation in check (in terms of the
share of profits received) if they require VC firms to provide a preferred
return to investors before distributing the “carry” to fund managers.31
When such preferred returns exist, in order to keep managers incentivized,
the distribution arrangements often include catch-up provisions that enti-
tle those who fulfill their hurdle rate requirements to receive a larger share
of the profits, up to the amount of the contractually specified profit split
between the investors and managers involved.32
Unsurprisingly, the recent recession has taken a serious toll on the ven-
ture capital industry, which has not yet fully recovered. Many VCs are
having difficulty raising funds and, as of May 2013, approximately 400 ven-
ture capital firms have either temporarily stopped investing or shut down
altogether.33 The challenges posed by the limited venture capital available
to early-stage or emerging companies are exacerbated by the fact that only
certain types of startups tend to attract VC investors in the first place.
Venture capital investment typically “focuses on young high-growth com-
panies, invests equity capital, rather than debt, takes higher risks in ex-
change for potential higher returns, has a longer investment horizon than
traditional financing, monitors portfolio companies actively via board par-
ticipation, strategic marketing, governance, and capital structure,”34 and
favors companies that present the opportunity for a smooth exit strategy.
Unfortunately, these types of “qualifying” characteristics tend to make
social entrepreneurial endeavors, which may be structured as for-profit
but are also heavily concerned with generating social benefit (often at the
expense of generating revenue), much less attractive than purely profit-
oriented startups. A review of literature synthesized and presented by
O.M. Lehner reveals the following key differences that frequently exist
between social enterprises and traditional for-profit entrepreneurial ven-
tures, which often make the former less attractive for VC and traditional
forms of financing:
• ambiguous and sometimes dichotomous aims of [social enterprises],
torn between the social and commercial;
• alien corporate governance and legal and organizational structures
in [social enterprises] that are difficult to accept for traditional inves-
tors and lenders;
• cultural and cognitive distance-related barriers between for-profit in-
vestors and [social enterprises] that hinder communication;
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id.
33. John Tozzi, One Bright Spot for VCs? Impacting Investing, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS-
WEEK (May 2 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-02/one-bright-spot-for-
vcs-impact-investing.
34. Venture Capital, supra note 21.
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• social entrepreneurs’ narrations that are being hooked in the ‘social’
sphere and are lacking the managerial terminology, which leads to
severe skepticism in their managerial capabilities.35
As a result of such differences, traditional means of financing have
proven to be unsatisfactory or inadequate when it comes to launching and
sustaining the growth of various kinds of social entrepreneurial
endeavors.36
B. How Legal Entity and Structure Affect a Social Enterprise’s
Access to Capital
Traditionally, nonprofits and for-profits obtain different sources of cap-
ital with which to grow, presenting different long-term funding realities for
social entrepreneurs to consider. Nonprofits with 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
status redirect profits generated back into organizational operations, so as
to continue carrying out their missions for public benefit.37 As nonprofits
are not usually permitted to issue stock or distribute profits to their own-
ers,38 nonprofit social enterprises cannot offer equity to VCs or other for-
profit investors considering investment.39 Though nonprofits are able to
receive traditional debt financing, debt instruments are often less flexible
than equity financing and are also more expensive.40 Additionally, tradi-
tional lenders like banks are often hesitant to offer loans at competitive
rates to nonprofits, as they anticipate that the nonprofits’ access to other
sources of capital is likely low, which could present future difficulties with
repayment.41
Tax-exemption requirements that a nonprofit dedicate all assets to an
exempt purpose upon dissolution and that none of its assets inure to the
35. O.M. Lehner, Crowdfunding Social Ventures: A Model and Research Agenda, 15
ROUTLEDGE VENTURE CAP. J. (forthcoming 2013) (internal citations omitted).
36. See generally HILARY BROWN & EMMA MURPHY, THE FINANCING OF SOCIAL EN-
TERPRISES: A SPECIAL REPORT BY THE BANK OF ENGLAND (2003), available at http://www.uk
.coop/sites/storage/public/downloads/bank_of_england_the_financing_of_social_enterprises_
0_0.pdf; Alessandro Fedele & Raffaele Miniaci, Do Social Enterprises Finance Their Invest-
ments Differently from For-Profit Firms? The Case of Social Residential Services in Italy, 1 J.
SOC. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 174 (2010); Rory Ridley-Duff, Social Enterprise as a Socially Ra-
tional Business, 14 INT’L J. ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAV. & RES. 291 (2008); Ajay Agrawal et
al., Entrepreneurial Finance and the Flat-World Hypothesis: Evidence from Crowd-Funding
Entrepreneurs in the Arts (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 10-08, 2010).
37. Exemption Requirements – 501(c)(3) Organizations, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Require
ments-Section-501%28c%29%283%29-Organizations (in order to qualify as a 501(c)(3) or-
ganization, an entity cannot distribute its earnings to “any private shareholder or
individual.”).
38. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2008) (providing that
nonprofits can neither distribute earnings, including dividends, to individuals during the life
of the organization nor distribute assets in the event of the nonprofit’s dissolution).
39. Kelley, supra note 14, at 353-54.
40. Id. at 354.
41. Id.
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benefit of individuals may provide comfort to social enterprise investors
worried about mission drift, but these requirements also limit an enter-
prise’s “ability to restructure and attract investors who want to participate
in the business gains upon dissolution.”42 Thus, startup/expansion capital
is often difficult for social enterprises to raise, and this alone can be pro-
hibitive to social entrepreneurs wishing to engage in the nonprofit space.
Further, fundraising issues are not necessarily solved by instead establish-
ing a for-profit entity, since such status forecloses the opportunity to re-
ceive funds from those typically most inclined to donate to social
organizations: the government and private foundations.43 For-profits are
also unable to receive tax-exempt donations.44 Additionally, the for-profit
structure of “double-bottom line” (designed to achieve both financial and
social returns) social enterprises does not necessarily aid in capitalization
efforts, as venture capitalists, institutional investors (e.g., pension funds),
and other common sources of for-profit investment often have expecta-
tions of market-rate returns, which such hybrid social enterprises are often
unequipped to deliver.45 Ultimately, the financial costs of a startup’s social
component may be seen by investors as a discount on return on invest-
ment (ROI), rendering the enterprise a relatively less worthwhile invest-
ment opportunity than other startups.
As a result of the perceived unattractiveness of investing in this space,
most startup social enterprises are relegated to settling for “patient capi-
tal,”46 which is difficult to secure and frequently a poor solution to the
woes of undercapitalization, even if such startups restrict their goals to
merely achieving slow, steady growth.47 Currently, charitable donations
from foundations represent the most significant source of financing for so-
42. Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 294-95 (2012) (citing Jim Fruchterman, For Love or Lucre,
STAN. SOC. INNOV. REV., Spring 2011, at 46, available at http://www.ssireview.org/articles/
entry/for_love_or_lucre).
43. Kelley, supra note 14, at 354 (citing Jed Emerson, The Nature of Returns: A Social
Capital Markets Inquiry into Elements of Investment and the Blended Value Proposition 10
(Harvard Bus. Sch. Soc. Enter. Series, Working Paper No. 17, 2000)).
44. I.R.C. §§ 170(a), (c) (2010).
45. Kelley, supra note 14, at 354 (citing Victor Fleischer, Urban Entrepreneurship and
the Promise of For Profit Philanthropy, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 95 (2007); SUS-
TAINABILITY & THE SKOLL FOUND., GROWING OPPORTUNITY: ENTREPRENEURIAL SOLU-
TIONS TO INSOLUBLE PROBLEMS 18 (2007)).
46. A single universal definition for patient capital has not been established, but it is
widely agreed to be characterized as long-term capital, where investors of patient capital are
not expecting short-term market rate returns, but do expect some social return. BROWN &
MURPHY, supra note 36, at 62.  More specifically, the Acumen Fund defines patient capital as
a “debt or equity investment in an early-stage enterprise providing low-income consumers
with access to healthcare, water, housing, alternative energy, or agricultural inputs.” What is
Patient Capital?, ACUMEN, http://acumen.org/ideas/patient-capital (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
47. Kelley, supra note 14, at 354-55.
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cial enterprises.48 However, contrary to the potential implication that so-
cial enterprises can rely on securing funding from foundations, it is in fact
not in the interest of sustainability for social enterprises to rely on these
foundations for significant or consistent funding. Foundations’ interests
are often project driven and, thus, more aligned with supporting social en-
terprises’ particular programs or projects that address specific problems,
rather than funding the organizations in a general, unrestricted manner.49
Ultimately, this often means that foundations are “less interested in the
overall organizational abilities and the long-term needs of a social
enterprise.”50
Foundation funding can be a problematic approach for public benefit
corporations, since financial gifts directed to particular projects are gener-
ally not unrestricted funding and do not give entities the flexibility to util-
ize donations for those purposes that they deem most important. This
presents an obstacle for recipient social enterprises that want to develop
long-term strategies and programs: they may instead have to use any funds
received for other short-term activities51 specified by the donor. Thus, be-
cause foundation donations are currently the most significant source of
financing, social enterprises often (and easily) find themselves undercapi-
talized. A serious consequence of such undercapitalization is that it can
force social entrepreneurs to focus their attention on raising more funds
simply to maintain their operations, rather than devote time and resources
to carrying out their actual mission and programming. The result is a prob-
lematic cycle: slow development of programs and lack of long-term pro-
gress can lead to even greater difficulty in obtaining the necessary
attention and future investments for further development or scaling.52
Furthermore, because the allocation of funds from foundations tends
to be based more on an organization’s needs than its performance, founda-
tions “pay little attention to thinking in strategic terms and measuring the
grant recipients’ results”53 and, therefore, do not know whether their do-
nations led to successful programmatic outcomes for recipients. This de-
tachment from the ultimate outcome of the donation likely does little to
fuel increased or repeat donations to the same organizations, a proposition
that is bolstered by the fact that foundations are known to contribute vari-
ous small donations to different organizations rather than large ones to a
smaller recipient pool.54 Finally, because of the lack of monitoring of out-
48. Mariarosa Scarlata & Luisa Alemany, Philanthropic Venture Capital: Can the Key
Elements of Venture Capital Be Applied Successfully to Social Enterprises 7 (Feb. 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1099277.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 6-7.
52. See id. at 7.
53. Id. at 1, 7; see also Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Philanthropy’s New
Agenda: Creating Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 121-30.
54. Scarlata & Alemany, supra note 48, at 7.
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comes and the trend of smaller, individual donations, foundations have
little incentive to put extensive effort into staking out worthy social enter-
prises that have the greatest potential to grow and benefit from their fund-
ing. Rather, nearly any organization with some sort of a positive mission
on a foundation’s radar could be seen as a “worthy” recipient, even if not
otherwise well positioned to succeed in the long term.55
In light of this, Porter and Kramer argue that foundations “create value
when achieving an equivalent social benefit with fewer dollars or when
creating greater social benefits for a comparable cost” and should screen
potential investments the way for-profit investors do, with an eye toward
recipients who will generate real results and a return on investment.56 If
charities were to select the best possible recipients for donation funding,
they would be able to fuel those organizations that are highly productive
and more likely to put the donations to good use over the long-term.
Through adopting such investment decision practices, including better
tracking of the return (monetary and social) on grants made, foundations
could measure the value they help to create in recipient organizations and
potentially help attract other donors to those same organizations. Such an
outcome could result in “improving the return on a larger pool of philan-
thropic resources. Furthermore, the performance of a non-profit can be
magnified by moving the foundation from the role of a mere capital pro-
vider to the role of a fully engaged partner.”57 If effectuated in this way,
donations can have sustainable value beyond just their immediate impact.
In addition to having a social impact on a particular grantee, foundation
donations might also increase the effectiveness of other organizations by
virtue of the fact that grantees can learn from one another’s successes, if
they pay attention to and replicate good practices.58
C. Is “Social Venture Capital” the Answer?
For the aforementioned reasons, foundation donations and venture
capital, as they currently exist, are not consistent or sustainable models of
financing nonprofit or for-profit social enterprises, respectively. In fact,
only 0.04 percent of U.S. startups and small business are funded by VCs
and only 0.91 percent are funded by angel investors.59 For-profit social
enterprises face the challenge of seeking capital investment while fulfilling
their dual objectives of increasing shareholder value and carrying out their
social mission (e.g., to benefit the environment or target community).
These simultaneously critical, though seemingly conflicting objectives
place additional pressure on social entrepreneurs to navigate tradeoffs
55. See id. at 1, 8.
56. Porter & Kramer, supra note 53, at 126.
57. Scarlata & Alemany, supra note 48, at 1, 8.
58. Porter & Kramer, supra note 53, at 124; Scarlata & Alemany, supra note 48, at 1, 8.
59. Jamie Farrell, The JOBS Act: What Startups and Small Businesses Need to Know,
FORBES (Sept. 21, 2012, 12:21 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/work-in-progress/2012/09/21/
the-jobs-act-what-startups-and-small-businesses-need-to-know-infographic.
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that may arise in finding a successful strategy to achieve both (and
grow).60
Philanthropic venture capital (PhVC) investment, or venture philan-
thropy, is a form of social venture capital that presents a promising alter-
native funding model, and it is becoming steadily more widespread.
According to a 2008 study, the first U.S. PhVC fund was established in
1980 and 69 percent of U.S. PhVC funds were established between 1998
and 2008.61 PhVC consists of “the application of the strategies and the
techniques developed within the venture capital industry to the financing
of social purpose enterprises.”62 A synthesis of various perspectives on
PhVC yields the following summary of key aspects of PhVC investment:
a) the provision of capital as well as expertise; b) the implementation of risk
management practices in the invested company; c) the prevalence of an ac-
countability-for-results process; d) a managing partner relationship between
the investor and the recipient company; e) a long-term investment perspective
(3-6 years business plans); f) the definition of a clear exit strategy. As such,
venture philanthropy is based on the principles of entrepreneurial business
and combines practices typically implemented in long-term for-profit VC in-
vestments with the mission-driven principles of the social sector.63
PhVC has been utilized by a variety of the organizational models sub-
sequently described in this note and constitutes anything from multi-donor
funds mimicking traditional VC funds and investment practices to funding
from more traditional charities or grant-making bodies.64 Three overall
categories of philanthropic venture capital include: 1) venture-generated
philanthropic funds, 2) venture-influence philanthropic funds, and 3) ven-
ture-parallel philanthropic funds.65 Philanthropic venture capitalists
(PhVCs)66 are additionally referred to as social venture capitalists, highly-
engaged philanthropies, or venture philanthropy investors.67 PhVCs fi-
nance target organizations based on the achievement of performance mile-
stones and essentially engage in a “value-added partnership”68 with the
target organization. In addition to their capital contributions, PhVCs mon-
60. Linda Rottenberg & Rhett Morris, New Research: If You Want to Scale Impact,
Put Financial Results First, HARV. BUS. REV. HBR BLOG NETWORK (Jan. 9, 2013, 2:09 PM),
http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2013/01/new_research_if_you_want_to_sc.html.
61. Scarlata & Alemany, supra note 48, at 5 (listing three overall categories of philan-
thropic venture capital: 1) venture-generated philanthropic funds; 2) venture-influence phil-
anthropic funds; and 3) venture-parallel philanthropic funds).
62. Id. at 2 (defining PhVC through a synthesis of various academic definitions of the
concept; as a relatively young financing model, it is still inconsistently defined).
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 1, 4.
65. Id. at 4.
66. Id. at 3 (“Philanthropic venture capitalists are social subjects whose aim consists of
investing those funds raised from various donors - who may be wealthy individuals, enter-
prises, and/or foundations - in organizations with high social impact.”).
67. Scarlata & Alemany, supra note 48, at 3.
68. Id.
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itor the progress of their target organizations and provide expertise and
strategic guidance in an effort to achieve greater social return on
investment.69
The emerging presence of such investors and so-called “social venture
capital” may be part of the answer to the funding challenges of social en-
terprises. Ashoka, a global nonprofit dedicated to creating the largest net-
work of high impact social entrepreneurs around the world, embodies the
spirit of social venture capital activity and directly invests in high potential
social entrepreneurs. Hybrid organizations, such as Acumen Fund,
Bridges Ventures, and Root Capital, instead channel patient capital to
high social-return investments globally.70 The Acumen Fund’s focus, for
example, is to reduce poverty worldwide through patient capital invest-
ment, as it believes that neither capital markets nor charity/aid are enough
to develop sustainable solutions to curing systemic poverty. Acumen sees
patient capital as a means of
bridging the gap between the efficiency and scale of market-based approaches
and the social impact of pure philanthropy. . . . [It] has a high tolerance for
risk, has long time horizons, is flexible to meet the needs of entrepre-
neurs,. . .is unwilling to sacrifice the needs of end customers for the sake of
shareholders . . . [and] ultimately demands accountability in the form of a
return of capital: proof that the underlying enterprise can grow sustainably in
the long run.71
Such dedicated approaches taken by various organizations are positive de-
velopments in the world of investment in social enterprise but, ultimately,
are not enough.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FACILITATING GREATER INVESTMENT
IN SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
A. How Could Changes to our Legal/Regulatory System Provide Greater
Incentives for Investment in Social Enterprise?
In light of the economic downturn’s impact on venture capital activity
and venture capitalists’ highly critical approach to startup candidates,
policymakers and regulators believe that to increase emerging companies’
access to venture capital investment, a stronger “venture capital cycle”72
must be created. This can be achieved by “(1) boosting venture capital
fundraising (particularly from institutional investors), (2) promoting ven-
ture capital and other risk capital investments in promising, mostly early-
stage growth companies, and (3) encouraging access to capital markets in
69. Id. (“Besides, in case PhVCs take a seat in the board of directors of the organiza-
tions they back, they retain important rights which allow them to intervene in the company’s
operations when necessary.”).
70. Cohen & Sahlman, supra note 15.
71. What is Patient Capital?, supra note 46.
72. “Stimulating a rapid and smooth process of raising, structuring and exiting funds is
crucial to start and restart venture capital cycles, but also to develop a sustainable and robust
venture capital industry.” Vermeulen & Nunes, supra note 26, at 2.
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order to improve liquidity and exit opportunities that enable venture capi-
tal funds to return capital to their investors.”73 A number of policymakers
and regulatory experts recognize venture capital funds should be ex-
empted from stringent registration and reporting requirements to which
alternative investment fund advisers/managers are subject.74 The notion is
that such venture capital exemptions in the Dodd-Frank Act are appropri-
ate because VC funds do not threaten the stability of the financial sys-
tem,75 and by avoiding the financially burdensome registration
requirements, more money remains with VCs for potential startup
investments.
However, reviving the VC market is perhaps a small piece of the puz-
zle for increasing potential capital available to those for-profit social enter-
prises even capable of attracting VC investment. Below market rate
returns prove unattractive to such investors, particularly when it is difficult
to measure social outcomes and “disentangle” the risks presented by
blended value enterprises from the financial returns.76 Informational
asymmetries additionally contribute to challenges in establishing invest-
ment relationships between investors and social enterprises. A more
proactive role assumed by government could help to remedy this type of
issue.
[F]inancial institutions are handicapped in local markets where they can’t ac-
cess information about the level of entrepreneurial activity, outcomes of past
investments, and so forth—making them understandably leery of committing
funds. . . . [E]ntrepreneurs in emerging venture markets often lack insight into
the expectations of top-tier private investors, potential strategic partners, and
investment bankers. Government can help bridge these information gaps by
publishing data and facilitating conversations. It can also encourage local
trade associations to do so, perhaps by providing them with funding.77
The government’s role as facilitator could benefit not only the social entre-
preneurs who may be given a better chance of connecting with investors,
but also the government itself. Social enterprises that ultimately get the
funding necessary to scale and successfully deliver public benefit services
can help reduce government expenditure on public benefits. That is, the
government can realize cost savings as a result of social impact achieved
by social enterprises.
The Social Enterprise Ecosystem and Economic Development Com-
mission Act of 2013 (SEEED Commission Act), introduced to the House
on May 17, 2013, signals a step in the right direction. This bill proposes to
73. Id. at 1.
74. Id.
75. Id at 46 (The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank Act”) and Europe’s Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive
(AIFMD) include such “venture capital exemptions”).
76. Antony Bugg-Levine et al., A New Approach to Funding Social Enterprises, HARV.
BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 123.
77. Josh Lerner & William Sahlman, Reviving Entrepreneurship, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Mar. 2012), available at http://hbr.org/2012/03/reviving-entrepreneurship/ar.
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establish the Commission on the Advancement of Social Enterprise,
whose purpose is “to examine and make recommendations with respect to
ways the Federal Government can support and utilize the transformative
power of social enterprises.”78 The Commission would be required to both
establish criteria for identifying social enterprises for purposes of federal
programs and identify opportunities for the federal government to engage
social enterprises in job creation and strengthening of local economies.79
Though it is unlikely that this bill will be passed,80 it reflects a growing
understanding that social enterprise has tremendous potential to both
stimulate the economy and save the government money through the enter-
prises’ work to address social issues often otherwise left to be remedied
(or not) by government spending and public benefit programs. Time will
tell how Congress responds, but it is crucial that more policymakers turn
their focus to this area and develop creative ways to frame the benefits of
a more positive regulatory environment for social enterprise, so that Con-
gressional buy-in may be achieved.
As entrepreneurs are, by nature, ambitious and tenacious, they “can be
relied on to relentlessly pursue opportunities; the key for government is to
ensure the right mix of risks and rewards to elicit a broad-based
response.”81
1. Government-Backed Social Impact Bonds
Short of legislation, the government can engage in other activities to
spur investment and capitalize on the fact that investors’ interest in high-
growth, socially impactful businesses is increasing.82 To illustrate, SJF Ven-
tures (SJF), which invests in businesses focused on social impact or sus-
tainability, exceeded its target and raised a $90 million fund over 15
months in the current economic environment to invest in growth compa-
nies having social impact.83 The fund’s investors are a diverse group com-
posed of both those primarily interested in socially responsible investing
and others primarily interested in financial return: large banks, insurance
companies, foundations, and individuals.84 Successful VC firms such as
78. H.R. 2043, 113th Cong. §2 (2013), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/113/hr2043/text.
79. Id.
80. GovTrack.us projects a one percent chance of enactment. GovTrack.us, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2043 (last Apr. 26, 2014).
81. Lerner & Sahlman, supra note 77.
82. See Tozzi, supra note 33. Investors’ Circle, a highly active, national group of so-
cially conscious angel investors, recently ranked in the top ten most active angel groups in the
U.S. SILICON VALLEY BANK & ANGEL RES. INST., HALO REPORT: US ANGEL GROUP UP-
DATE: 2013 YEAR IN REVIEW 4 (2014), available at http://www.svb.com/uploadedFiles/Con
tent/Blogs/Halo_Report/halo-report-2013.pdf.
83. Tozzi, supra note 33.
84. Id.
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SJF will hopefully set a positive example for VCs and angel investors skep-
tical of the financial and social rewards of investing in social enterprises.
Sir Ronald Cohen, credited with being one of the pioneers of venture
capitalism, is now attempting to create a cultural shift toward impact in-
vesting in social enterprises, rather than just traditional business star-
tups.85 His goal is to harness the power of venture capital investment and
direct it toward organizations that will create social returns, rather than
just quick financial returns, for the ultimate purpose of reducing social
inequality.86 Cohen believes that such social inequality, manifested by a
large gap between the rich and poor, has not been effectively reduced by
philanthropic efforts—an ineffective model that hampers the social orga-
nizations from scaling and achieving their full potential—and also suffers
from the government’s inability to “redress the balance.”87
To combat this problem, Cohen and other supporters of the field be-
lieve that social enterprise strikes the right balance between social return
and financial return to enable it to attract capital investment from those
that would otherwise look to invest in purely for-profit businesses.88 Social
impact bonds (SIBs) are financial instruments that earn a return for the
investor if the cost or incidence of a social issue is reduced with compara-
ble or better results by the work of an investee nonprofit/social enterprise
than would be achieved by a government program.89 SIBs are designed to
measure the social impact of the work conducted by investees and trans-
late this impact into a tangible financial metric for investors.
The first SIB was launched in the U.K. in 2010, with the goal of reduc-
ing the recidivism rates of convicted criminals.90 Rather than relying on
donations, the Peterborough Bond was backed by the U.K. government to
raise £6 million for three charitable organizations to carry out their mis-
sions of helping former prisoners successfully reintegrate into society.91
The bond issuance was successful because of investor confidence in the
charities’ abilities to lower the recidivism rates. If a greater than 7.5 per-
cent reduction in recidivism rates was not achieved by the charities’ ef-
forts, the bond’s investors would lose their money.92 If recidivism were
reduced at the rate of 15 to 17.5 percent, the U.K. Ministry of Justice and
the Big Lottery Fund would repay the investors their initial investment
plus the yield on the bond.93 This yield could range from 2.5 to 13 percent,
85. Nigel Roberts, Sir Ronald Cohen: Venture Capitalist to Social Capitalist, INSEAD




88. See Roberts, supra note 85.
89. Cohen & Sahlman, supra note 15.
90. Cohen, supra note 1.
91. Roberts, supra note 85.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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depending on the specific reduction rate achieved. The initial investors
could, therefore, receive a 13 percent return on their initial investment if
recidivism were reduced by 15 percent.94 With decreased repeat offending
and subsequent prison stays, the costs to both society and the U.K. gov-
ernment associated with recidivism could be reduced.
SIBs present an innovative means of (1) enticing investors to invest in
organizations working to address social or environmental issues, because
of the dual potential for social and financial return, and (2) securing a
large source of capital (for the duration of the bond) for nonprofits or
social enterprises that would otherwise likely be forced to resort to contin-
uous fundraising in order to continue operating. Such investments would
permit social enterprises to focus more on carrying out their missions and
less on raising capital. And because success in carrying out their missions
generates financial return for the bond investors, this can serve to attract
greater investment in future bonds.95 Thus, a positive cycle can be created
in which substantial capital investment raised through bonds is allocated to
the nonprofits and social enterprises and enables them to scale success-
fully, which in turn generates financial return for the bondholders and in-
creases the attractiveness of future investment in SIBs. Cohen and others
believe that this will revolutionize the way business is done and that SIBs
highlight the potential for different business models and financial instru-
ments to facilitate social impact and government cost savings on a more
meaningful scale.96
2. The Role of Legal Entities, Tax Implications, and How Hybrid Forms
Can be Better Utilized
Nonprofit and charitable organization entity forms are established
under state law.97 Two major draws for ventures establishing as one of
these forms are the positive ethos associated with nonprofits in the public
service community and the potential federal tax benefits.98 Most nonprof-
its are eligible for 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status; however, this status is con-
tingent on complying with the accompanying non-distribution constraint,
which dictates that no part of an organization’s net earnings are provided
to any private shareholder or individual.99 If the distribution constraint is
violated, tax-exempt status can be revoked or profits can be subjected to
income tax.100 Federal tax law thus incentivizes a charity or nonprofit to




97. See Choose Your Business Structure, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba
.gov/category/navigation-structure/starting-managing-business/starting-business/choose-your-
business-stru (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
98. Katz & Page, supra note 5, at 70.
99. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (2008).
100. The “commerciality doctrine.” Katz & Page, supra note 5, at 70.
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pose or help to achieve its charitable or tax-exempt purpose. Federal tax
law further discourages “unrelated” business activity via the Unrelated
Business Income Tax (UBIT), which requires that a tax-exempt organiza-
tion that engages in unrelated business activities pay corporate income tax
on the profits earned by those activities.101 Tax-exempt status can be simi-
larly revoked if the organization conducts an excessive amount of unre-
lated business activity.102 In the face of these limitations, an increasing
number of nonprofits have, in recent years, embraced earned income strat-
egies in order to reduce dependence on donations and grants.103 Earned
income strategies are methods nonprofits have adopted to allow them to
raise funds through modes that may resemble activities that have tradi-
tionally been considered as for-profit, such as the sale of goods and ser-
vices.104 Earned income also provides the added benefit of expanding the
“controllers’ power over their organization’s resources because earned in-
come—unlike donations—is generally unencumbered by donor-imposed
restrictions on its use.”105 This flexibility is important, as nonprofits deriv-
ing a majority of their funding via restricted grants or donations may oper-
ate or utilize funds in a manner resulting in unintended violations of tax-
exempt status.
Tax law and policy hold significant implications for the work of entre-
preneurs and can heavily influence their decision making. For example,
capital gains taxation reduces the amount of profit retained by an entity
and thus influences the supply of risk capital available; investment may be
depressed by limitations on the deduction of investment losses, particu-
larly because most startups fail and experience such losses; and individuals
might be deterred from working for startups because of tax policies that
tax income earned from exercising stock options at the same high taxation
rates as ordinary income.106
Cash flows can be increased and investment can be encouraged by tax
policies that tax at the corporate level and allow tax credits during years of
loss; however, tax policy does not create much of a safety net for startup
businesses. Startups often generate losses for their first few years as fixed
costs exceed income, and accumulate any deductions and credits they
qualify for as net operating losses (NOL).107 NOLs must be carried for-
ward and can be used to offset taxable income once the entity becomes
101. Id. at 79.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 60.
104. Earned Income 101 for Nonprofits, 4GOOD (Jan. 18, 2012), http://non-
profitwebinars.com/past_webinars/1182012-earned-income-101-for-nonprofit/ (70 percent of
funds raised by non-profits in 2008 came from earned income strategies).
105. Katz & Page, supra note 5, at 61.
106. See Lerner & Sahlman, supra note 77.
107. See GRANT THORNTON LLP, TIP ON TAX: MANAGING AN IMPORTANT ASSET—
YOUR NET OPERATING LOSSES 1 (2012), http://www.grantthornton.com/staticfiles/GTCom/
Technology/TIP%20on%20Tax/TIPonTAX_Final.pdf (“Many technology companies gener-
ate operating losses when developing new products. These losses can result in significant tax
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profitable,108 but many startups fail before becoming profitable and hav-
ing the opportunity to reap such tax advantages.109 This possibility may be
even higher for hybrid entities that choose not to prioritize the financial
bottom-line over social returns. In light of the tax drawbacks to investment
and involvement in entrepreneurial ventures (which inevitably carry this
risk of failure), in order to “promote entrepreneurial action, policy needs
to change the after-tax payoff structure for both human and financial capi-
tal, making gains more attractive and losses less painful.”110 This is partic-
ularly important for social enterprises, which are perceived to be even
riskier and prone to losses than non-social impact startups as a result of
their focus on social returns in addition to, rather than solely on, profits.
Increasing tax incentives amenable to investment in entrepreneurial
ventures could make a world of difference for social investment. Central
to this is creating tax incentives for hybrid/for-profit entities, based on
their socially beneficial activities, and amending existing tax policy that
disadvantages nonprofit social enterprises’ access to certain tax incentives
(compared to those available to traditional for-profit entities) by virtue of
their legal structures, which, for example, may prevent them from issuing
shares.111 As is currently being discussed in the U.K., the U.S. should con-
sider undertaking a longer-term, strategic evaluation of tax policy to en-
courage the promotion and growth of investment in social ventures.112
a. Hybrid Forms
Meanwhile, for-profit social enterprises strive to achieve a “double
bottom line” or even “triple bottom line” (financial, social, and environ-
mental returns). Such an entity aims to “use business means to address
social problems. . . . [U]nlike a nonprofit social enterprise, it is owned (in
whole or in part) by equity investors, and one of its core goals (alongside
its social purposes) is to generate returns for those investor-owners,” in-
cluding founders entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the organiza-
tion’s sale or initial public offering (IPO).113 A critical difference between
nonprofits and for-profits in the social enterprise space is the “ability of
the enterprise’s founders, controllers and investors to lawfully appropriate
savings benefits that can be used to offset future taxable income. For U.S. federal tax pur-
poses, NOLs can be carried forward for up to 20 years.”).
108. Id.
109. See Deborah Gage, The Venture Capital Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start Ups-Fail, Wall St. J.
(Sept. 20, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723963904437202045
78004980476429190.
110. Lerner & Sahlman, supra note 76.
111. NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS, NCVO COMMISSION ON
TAX INCENTIVES FOR SOCIAL INVESTMENT 3 (2012), available at http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/
sites/default/files/ncvo_commission_on_tax_incentives_for_social_investment.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Katz & Page, supra note 5, at 62.
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its surpluses for their private benefit.”114 As a result, social enterprises are
increasingly adopting new hybrid entity forms, which seem to allow them
to present a more lucrative image to investors, as well as a socially con-
scious image that appeals to the public.
Social enterprises and new hybrid entities exhibiting the aforemen-
tioned double or triple bottom line business plans often no longer fall into
the traditional three organizational categories—nonprofit, for-profit, or
government. Even so, social enterprises have been expected to establish
ways to gain access to traditional sources of capital in order to survive and
scale up.115 For such reasons, it is increasingly apparent that “outmoded
law and inappropriate old-style legal entities hamstring their socially trans-
formative plans.”116 In response, social entrepreneurs have expressed the
desire for state corporate law and federal tax regulations to be more ame-
nable to their dual purposes,117 one example of which might be greater
freedom from the perceived constraints of profit maximization,118 which is
typically expected by shareholders (and accommodated by board decision
making) of traditional businesses.119 Social entrepreneurs need both the
law and lawyers to adapt to their growing needs.120
To help address their challenges, multiple states have either enacted or
plan to enact various legal forms intended to promote for-profit social en-
terprise creation and the activities of social entrepreneurs in search of eq-
uity investment.121 Among these newer legal forms are the low-profit
limited liability company (L3C)122 and the benefit corporation.123 The
L3C is an exclusively for-profit variation of the limited liability company.
L3C legislation has been enacted on a state-by-state basis via amendments
114. Id.
115. Kelley, supra note 14, at 6.
116. Id.
117. Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y. 170,
171 (2012).
118. Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the
Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 635 (2007).
119. Katz & Page, supra note 5, at 89.
120. THOMAS J. BILLITTERI, MIXING MISSION AND BUSINESS: DOES SOCIAL ENTER-
PRISE NEED A NEW LEGAL APPROACH? (2007), http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/
files/content/docs/pubs/New_Legal_Forms_Report_FINAL.pdf.
121. Katz & Page, supra note 5, at 89.
122. While the L3C was first established in Vermont in 2008, see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3001(27) (2008), eight other states have since enacted similar legislation. See Laws, AMS.
FOR CMTY. DEV., http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws.html (last visited Apr.
26, 2014).
123. The benefit corporation was first established in Maryland in 2010. See MD. CODE
ANN., Corps. & Ass’ns § 5-6C-01 (West 2011). Benefit corporation legislation has since been
enacted in 19 states and the District of Columbia, and introduced in 14 other states. State by
State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORPORATION INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.benefit
corp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
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to each state’s LLC Act, enabling established L3Cs to enjoy the flexibility
and legal governance characteristics of the LLC form.124 The L3C was
designed as an improvement upon the LLC to benefit social ventures
through positive “low profit” branding and subsequently increased fund-
ing opportunities.125 Though an L3C does not qualify for tax-exempt sta-
tus, it must specify a charitable purpose126 to which its operations are
dedicated.127 This charitable purpose, combined with “low profit” brand-
ing, puts “the world on notice that the organization’s central purpose is
not maximizing profit” for owners,128 which can reduce entrepreneurs’
previously-discussed concerns regarding shareholder claims arising from
failure to maximize profits.129 Such branding can also garner positive at-
tention from the public and socially-minded investors, enabling L3Cs to
secure funding from foundations in the form of program-related invest-
ments (PRIs), for example.130 The L3C is designed to “combin[e] the key
features of the LLC with the IRS’ PRI requirements,”131 so as to make
L3Cs appealing and overcome foundations’ perceived risks or transaction
costs associated with making PRIs.132 L3Cs represent a symbolic step for-
ward in the field of social enterprise, though the long-term benefit of this
seemingly new means of obtaining capital will remain to be seen: the IRS
still has not classified L3Cs as qualifying PRIs133 and the ABA has ex-
pressed disapproval due to lack of clarity of the legal form.134
The benefit corporation, a for-profit entity structure, is also an appro-
priate model for companies with social and financial goals, both of which
may be considered in board decision-making.135 State benefit corporation
statutes require that a benefit corporation express its “purpose of creating
124. See Laws, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/
laws.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
125. Kelley, supra note 14, at 371-72.
126. This must be one of the enumerated charitable purposes laid out in the Internal
Revenue Code. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27)(A)(i).
127. See Raz, supra note 42, at 297.
128. Kelley, supra note 14, at 372.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 371-72; Raz, supra note 42, at 297 (“PRIs are loans to or equity investments
in either non-profits or for-profits for a charitable purpose, through which the lender or in-
vestor foundation can earn a return as long as the pursuit of the return is incidental to the
charitable purpose.”).
131. Kelley, supra note 14, at 372-73.
132. Id. at 372-73.
133. Raz, supra note 42, at 299.
134. Kelly Kleiman, L3Cs: A Cure in Search of a Disease, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.
(Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/l3cs_a_cure_in_search_of_a_
disease.
135. Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer
on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the Benefit
Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 639, 695 (2013).
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a general public benefit,”136 defined as the “material positive impact on
society and the environment” arising from the corporation’s business and
operations,137 in its articles of incorporation. A benefit corporation may
also identify a “specific public benefit” that it aims to generate, including:
(1) Providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities
with beneficial products or services;
(2) Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities
beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business;
(3) Preserving or improving the environment;
(4) Improving human health;
(5) Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge;
(6) Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit pur-
pose; and
(7) Conferring any other particular benefit on society or the
environment.138
These specific public benefits need not be stated in the articles of incorpo-
ration, however, so the entity is not bound to achieve any particular social
or environmental benefits.  Because state benefit corporation statutes re-
quire a commitment to achieving general public benefit but not specific
public benefits, they enable a benefit corporation to pursue any underlying
mission, so long as it is also working toward general public benefit.139 Ben-
efit corporations, therefore, have substantial flexibility in prioritizing their
activities, so long as some general benefit to society or the environment
can be seen as a consequence of the business’ operations. That said, the
requirement imposed on directors to create a material, positive impact (a
general public benefit, and any additionally desired specific public bene-
fits) guards against the corporation’s pursuing a very specific public bene-
fit without regard to the other (potentially undesirable) effects that doing
so might have on the public.140
Because benefit corporations need not commit to particular public
benefits, such entities are potentially less accountable to their initial un-
derlying social missions, though statutes address such issues of insufficient
accountability through provisions requiring benefit corporations to main-
tain their corporate purpose.141 The extent to which benefit corporations
can prioritize fidelity to their mission over the interests of shareholders is
controversial and ultimately remains to be decided by the courts; however,
despite shareholder primacy and wealth maximization norms in public,
for-profit companies, no state corporate statute affirmatively imposes a
136. Id. at 697.
137. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(b) (McKinney 2012).
138. Esposito, supra note 135, at 698.
139. William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Rede-
fining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 838-42 (2012).
140. Briana Cummings, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote
the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 592-93 (2012).
141. Esposito, supra note 135, at 698.
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requirement that directors maximize shareholder wealth.142 Further, con-
stituency statutes allow directors of corporations to consider the interests
of non-shareholders in their decision making, regardless of directors’ (per-
ceived) duty to maximize shareholder value.143 Thus, in satisfying their
fiduciary duties, corporate directors have the flexibility to look beyond
shareholders’ financial interests in their decision making, and benefit cor-
poration directors have an additional duty, derived from their required
commitment to their broad social purpose, to consider various stakeholder
groups, such as employees, subsidiaries, suppliers, customer beneficiaries
of the benefit corporation’s general or specific public benefit purposes, the
community, the environment, and society at large.144 No group is specifi-
cally designated to take precedence over another, so the board can priori-
tize decision making in regards to impact on different stakeholders as it
deems appropriate.145
Like the L3C, benefit corporation statutes also offer positive branding
to socially-minded businesses. This branding can garner positive consumer
and investor attention, as well as eligibility to issue equity, secure debt
financing, and obtain PRIs.146 However, because benefit corporations are
not required to specify a particular social mission and are annually re-
quired to self-report only whether they are promoting general public bene-
fit, not all benefit corporations are true social enterprises.147 Ultimately,
while benefit corporations can benefit from the “feel good” label associ-
ated with the entity status, there is little guaranteed external oversight or
protection of the social element of the business to comfort its socially-
minded shareholders or investors. Though shareholders of benefit corpo-
rations have litigation rights, “they face substantial obstacles in challeng-
ing the directorial action—including the formidable business judgment
rule, demand requirements, and other procedural hurdles”148 of derivative
litigation.  Even though directors are insulated from shareholder deriva-
142. Though state statutory law does not require corporations to maximize shareholder
value, some case law does, in fact, impose a duty on directors to prioritize the interests of
shareholder wealth over the interests of non-shareholders in certain circumstances. See Para-
mount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43-44 (Del. 1993) (when there is a
change of control in a company); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (when a company is for sale).
143. Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 460-61 (2002).
144. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:18-6(a) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(a)(1)(C) (2011); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-788(A)(1) (2011).
145. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organiza-
tion?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591 (2011); Cummings, supra 140, at 606.
146. Id. at 302 (explaining that a benefit corporation must show its activity is in further-
ance of a charitable purpose in order to qualify for foundation PRIs).
147. Raz, supra note 42, at 302.
148. Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 619, 641 (2010) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise].
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tive liability for making social or environmentally-related business deci-
sions to the detriment of profit maximization,149 it is still in the hands of
shareholders to enforce the achievement of general public benefit150 by
voicing any concerns and holding directors accountable for relevant deci-
sion making. The issue here is that shareholders may lack or lose interest
in the public benefit mission and demand that officers and directors priori-
tize profit maximization,151 as in a traditional corporate entity. Directors
who fear the threat of shareholder claims for making business decisions
that favor mission over profit may be less willing to risk such activity.
Though not a legal form, the B Corporation (B Corp) is an interesting,
related innovation. B Lab, a nonprofit that initially lobbied for the crea-
tion of the benefit corporation form, created a third-party accreditation
scheme certifying companies as B Corps if they meet standards of social
and environmental performance, transparency, and accountability.152 Cer-
tification for a company (which does not have to be a benefit corporation)
is contingent on fulfilling compliance standards for its business operations
and fidelity to social mission.153 Essentially, the B Corp “stamp” is a
branding tool for companies that wish to be perceived by investors and the
public as genuinely socially-minded businesses.154 However, B Corp certi-
fication does not entitle companies to any special tax treatment, because it
is self-imposed and privately regulated by B Lab.155 Ultimately, while B
Corp certification provides another form of feel-good branding for a com-
pany, it does not seem to offer much in the way of meaningful legal pro-
tections or assurances to non-shareholder constituencies.156 For example,
the certification does not provide stakeholders with a right of action
against the B Corp if they believe that directors are not considering stake-
holder interests in their business decisions, unlike the rights provided by
the articles of incorporation of a registered benefit corporation.157 As far
as balancing protection for social mission, directorial discretion, and so-
cially- vs. non-socially-minded shareholder interests, both the benefit cor-
poration and B Corp certification leave something to be desired for long-
term sustainability of social enterprises.
149. Raz, supra note 42, at 304.
150. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07(b) (West 2011) (a benefit cor-
poration’s directors have no duties to the beneficiaries of the public benefit created by the
entity).
151. Raz, supra note 42, at 305.
152. What are B Corps?, CERTIFIED. B. CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
153. Katz & Page, supra note 5, at 89.
154. Kelley, supra note 14, at 377.
155. Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise, supra note 148, at 637.
156. Though socially or environmentally motivated shareholders who invest in a B Cor-
poration could serve as a proxy for other stakeholder constituencies, such non-shareholders
have no standing to litigate against the entity. Id. at 641-42.
157. Id. at 640-41.
280 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 3:257
The flexible purpose corporation (FPC), established by the California
Corporate Flexibility Act of 2011, is the newest hybrid form and is de-
signed to enable a company to pursue both a business purpose and special
purpose(s).158 Dana Brakman Reiser states that the FPC falls between the
L3C and the benefit corporation on a “spectrum of flexibility.”159 Like an
L3C, the FPC provides “significant flexibility and discretion for founders
and directors,” as well as the “expansive rights, power and protections for
shareholder investors” characteristic of the benefit corporation.160 The
California legislation establishes more extensive reporting requirements161
than those required for traditional corporations, does not require any spe-
cific prioritization of the business purpose and special purpose(s), and
grants FPC directors additional discretion162 to pursue decision making
based on interests beyond those of shareholders,163 similar to the provi-
sions of constituency statutes. However, the directorial protection codified
in the California statute does not translate to unbounded directorial dis-
cretion; rather, it just provides the FPC “permission to consider the special
purpose or purposes stated in an FPC’s articles of incorporation.”164 This
is in direct contrast to the benefit corporation requirement that directors
consider non-shareholder interests in their business decisions.165 Addi-
tionally, while benefit corporation directors must consider a wide range of
non-shareholder interests and are not required to prioritize these interests
in a particular manner or to disclose plans for prioritization, FPC directors
may only choose to consider non-shareholder interests that are related to
the special purpose(s) laid out in the FPC’s articles of incorporation.166
The comparatively more limited, specific requirements for FPC gov-
ernance suggest better guidance and perhaps more manageable duties for
FPC directors engaging in business decision-making.167 Further, if the
FPC’s business purpose and special purpose(s) are ever at odds, directors
and officers can make business decisions that they deem appropriate with-
158. S.B. 201, 2011-2012 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
159. Dana Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing: Flexible Purpose Corporations 4
(Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 311) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser,
The Next Big Thing], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2166474.
160. Id.
161. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500 (2012).
162. See id. § 2700(c) (“In discharging his or her duties, a director may consider those
factors, and give weight to those factors, as the director deems relevant, including the short-
term and long-term prospects of the flexible purpose corporation, the best interests of the
flexible purpose corporation and its shareholders, and the purposes of the flexible purpose
corporation as set forth in its articles”).
163. Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing, supra note 159, at 10.
164. Id. at 11.
165. Benefit Corp vs. Certified B Corp, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://www.benefit
corp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
166. Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing, supra note 159, at 12.
167. See id. at 11.
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out the threat of being easily challenged by shareholders.168 Thus, this
flexibility might ultimately make it difficult for shareholders to bring duty
of care claims against the directors for ordinary business decisions, since
the directors are likely to be protected by the business judgment rule.169
Though monitoring and enforcement of FPC directors’ duties rests solely
on shareholders, Brakman Reiser argues that they have weak legal tools to
enforce the blended mission mandate against “ordinary hazards.”170 For-
tunately, shareholders do hold much greater legal power in situations
where the FPC abandons its dedication to its special purpose(s) or its
blended mission; a two-thirds majority vote is required to consent to such
decisions.171 Ultimately, Brakman Reiser questions whether there are suf-
ficient incentives for shareholders to thoroughly consider the information
from FPC disclosures and proactively police an FPC’s blended mission,172
so as to promote accountability.
While these new legal forms have helped some social enterprises to
secure the investment and consumer support necessary to thrive, investors
may still remain skeptical of the value such entities can offer. Endeavor,
an organization that helps entrepreneurs access global capital markets to
fuel growth in employment and social impact, has found that the manner
in which social entrepreneurs leading social enterprises “make tradeoffs
between social and financial goals is a critical factor in determining the
degree to which their companies will grow.”173 Endeavor advocates for
social entrepreneurs to design business models that closely align desired
financial and social goals in order to minimize tradeoffs and friction aris-
ing from the competing objectives. It recommends dealing with these
tradeoffs by prioritizing financial goals to maximize long-term sus-
tainability and found that enterprises that do so are more likely to grow
and achieve greater social impact.174 While the new hybrid forms are a
step in the right direction toward managing such tradeoffs, corporate gov-
ernance clearly remains an open issue, and these legal forms’ long-term
contributions to the growth and sustainability of social enterprise are yet
to be seen. Certainly, more lawyers must learn about and grasp the bene-
fits of utilizing legal entities creatively so as to manage such competing
priorities and help their social enterprise clients position themselves for
successful investment and scaling.
168. See id. at 12.
169. Assuming directors can argue that good faith decision-making favoring the busi-
ness purpose over specific purpose (or vice versa) does not preclude achieving the other type
of purpose, it would seem fairly simple for directors to satisfy the business judgment rule and
show informed judgment and decision making in the best interest of the company. Id. at 17.
170. Id. at 19.
171. Id. at 15.
172. Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing, supra note 159, at 20.
173. Rottenberg & Morris, supra note 60.
174. See id.
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3. Securities Regulations
In addition to differing tax treatments and governance duties for the
various legal entity choices, there are also varying securities implications
for the investment in, and consequent survival of, social enterprises.
“[T]he federal securities regulation status of interests in for-profit social
enterprise ventures is important for choice-of-entity reasons . . . [,]for capi-
tal-structuring reasons within individual forms of entity, and for risk-man-
agement reasons at the entity level.”175 Just as federal securities regulation
plays into entity choice, the increasing presence of hybrid legal forms and
the differences amongst them additionally complicate securities regula-
tion, where “[t]he current financial regulatory system depends on labeling
interests and instruments by their specific type as a means of determining
the form and manner of regulation.”176 The variety of state statutes under
which entities can be established creates further inconsistency. It has been
suggested that adoption of standardized entity forms for social enterprises
across states could potentially lead to greater clarity as to how to treat the
securities issued by various entity forms (i.e., as for nonprofits vs. for
profits).177
Financial instruments generating financial return to the instrument
holder are typically treated as securities under federal law (the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934);178 for-profit social
enterprises fall under this category, even if they do not end up generating
financial return. However, in the interest of not unduly burdening organi-
zations with charitable purposes, nonprofits issuing financial instruments
are generally granted privileges and registration exemptions. As for-profit
social enterprises have a social benefit purpose and may issue securities
with little profit potential, similar disclosure exemptions under the afore-
mentioned Acts could eliminate some of the time-intensive and financially
burdensome disclosures that could otherwise discourage social entrepre-
neurs from establishing as for-profits.179 Thus, similar exemptions as those
provided to nonprofits could encourage social enterprises “by decreasing
the cost of raising capital from the public.”180 Additional securities-related
limitations on social venture startups trace back to the early 2000s. An
increase in securities regulations introduced in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002181 stifled venture capital investment in startups perceived to have po-
tential difficulty meeting the then-newly-mandated compliance require-
175. Joan M. Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding For-Profit Social
Enterprises, 25 Regent U. L. Rev. 299, 305 (2013).
176. Id. at 326-27.
177. See id. at 327.
178. See id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006
& Supp. V 2011).
179. Heminway, supra note 175, at 325.
180. Id.
181. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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ments,182 such as § 404(b),183 within a short period of time. Such startups
necessarily became less attractive for investment, and social enterprises
fell squarely within that category of organizations. Fortunately, the Jump-
start Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act)184 now exempts emerging
growth companies from the aforementioned compliance requirement for a
few years.185 One of the underlying purposes of the JOBS Act is to in-
crease entrepreneurs’ access to capital and investment funding by reducing
such securities regulations faced by small businesses like social enterprises.
Despite the goals of the JOBS Act, the various fees that still must be paid
by such enterprises might still not be low enough to benefit them. The
potential benefits of the JOBS Act may similarly be threatened by the
implications of a particular provision in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.186 Sec-
tion 415 required Congress to study whether the existing criteria for ac-
credited investor status should be amended.187 The purpose of the
accredited investor standard is “to protect investors by allowing only those
who can withstand financial losses access to unregistered securities offer-
ings” and to “streamline capital formation for small business.”188 Regard-
ing amendment, there was speculation that the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA) would push for a General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) recommendation that Congress raise the net in-
come and net worth thresholds qualifying individuals as accredited
investors.189
Fortunately, in July 2013, the GAO released its findings and recognized
that the aforementioned changes in the accredited investor standard could
significantly reduce the existing pool of qualified angel investors,190
thereby reducing entrepreneurs’ access to a significant source of early-
stage capital. The GAO recommended that the SEC consider additional
criteria for satisfying the accredited investor standard (beyond net worth),
182. This requires costly and time-consuming external audits of internal controls—espe-
cially burdensome for small businesses.
183. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2012).
184. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
185. Id. § 103.
186. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
187. Id. § 415.
188. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-13-640, ALTERNATIVE CRI-
TERIA FOR QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED (2013)
[hereinafter GAO REP.], http://gao.gov/assets/660/655963.pdf.
189. Catherine Mott, Dodd-Frank Rears its Ugly Head, ANGEL CAP. ASS’N (Jun. 17,
2013), http://www.angelcapitalassociation.org/blog/dodd-frank-rears-its-ugly-head. Such pro-
posed changes arose in response to concerns that an increasing and perhaps inflated number
of individuals have qualified as accredited investors based on their net worth, due to the fact
that the standard had not been updated since the 1980s (save excluding the value of an indi-
vidual’s primary residence from his net worth). GAO REP., supra note 188.
190. GAO REP., supra note 188, at 18.
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such as identified liquid investments and the use of a registered advisor.191
The SEC agreed with the GAO’s recommendations, though it remains to
be seen whether more stringent thresholds in the name of investor protec-
tion may arise in the future. Though social enterprise startups are not
traditional or public companies, they are still as highly interconnected with
and affected by the state of securities regulation as the corporate law and
tax regimes.
B. Is Crowdsourcing Capital/Crowdfunding Part of the Solution?
The financial crisis in the past decade has increased pressure for social
entrepreneurs to obtain creative sources of financing, given the need for
reduced public sector spending to avoid amplifying high governmental
debt.192 This has raised the stakes for social entrepreneurs and made it
necessary for them to look to alternative funding sources. Crowdfunding is
the concept of targeting a large, disperse population of individuals from
whom to raise small amounts of money for the ultimate purpose of raising
a large aggregate sum to support a particular venture.193 It is yet a contro-
versial practice that is believed by some to unlock great potential for fund-
ing social entrepreneurial endeavors. Despite the sparse academic
literature on the implications of crowdfunding for the benefit of social en-
terprises,194 crowdfunding does seem to provide a valuable alternative to
the investment methods described herein, as it relies on the small funding
decisions of individual crowd investors who look more to the core values
of a social enterprise and its mission, rather than exhaustively analyzing its
business plan, assets, etc.195
Since the JOBS Act was signed into law in 2012 and lifted the ban on
startups seeking investment from non-accredited investor individuals (i.e.,
individuals of the general public), the use of crowdfunding platforms like
Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and others has increased as a means of funding
small businesses and nonprofits.196 Fundable, which was launched in con-
junction with the JOBS Act, is the first equity crowdfunding platform, and
others are anticipated to arise. However, though the Act required their
release by December 2012,197 the SEC has yet to promulgate its final regu-
lations of Title II and Title III, which will address the protection of inves-
tors and encouragement of startup investment, particularly via the use of
crowdfunding platforms. Currently, however, only high income, high net
worth investors can legally invest via crowdfunding sites, though the afore-
191. Id. at 29. The GAO proposed that such alternative criteria could effectively bal-
ance the accredited investor standard’s dual purposes of investor protection and capital
formation.




196. Farrell, supra note 59.
197. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
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mentioned regulations are expected to open crowdfunding to all potential
investors.198 A critical purpose of the SEC regulations is to safeguard in-
vestors through various strategies, including restricting the amount indi-
viduals can annually invest through crowdfunding (thereby limiting
foreseeable financial losses arising from high-risk startup investments), en-
gaging crowdfunding intermediaries in preventing fraud by startups, and
generally protecting the unsophisticated investor.199 The currently pro-
posed regulations200 remain inadequate for achieving their protective
purpose.201
The Investor Advisory Committee202 recommends amendment of the
proposed regulations to better protect unsophisticated, low net worth in-
vestors from the inherent risks associated with allowing “early stage start-
up companies to sell securities [to such investors] based on limited infor-
mation[.]”203 Changes the Committee believes necessary to help ensure
investors better “understand the risks of crowdfunding and avoid unaf-
fordable financial losses” include: setting tighter investment limits for in-
vestors; strengthening the enforcement mechanisms for investment limits;
requiring investors to agree to electronic delivery of disclosures, and clari-
fying and strengthening the obligations of intermediaries to prevent fraud-
ulent offerings and to help ensure startups’ compliance with crowdfunding
title and regulations.204
Ultimately, if the regulations create greater formal allowances of eq-
uity crowdfunding platforms, there must also be adequate protection for
the community of non-accredited, lower net worth, and inevitably less so-
phisticated investors that will have access to such platforms. It remains to
be seen whether the regulations will be successfully designed and imple-
mented to provide “reasonable investor protections, and the fair and cost-
effective marketplace, necessary to ensure [crowdfunding’s] viability as a
small company capital formation tool.”205 Ideally, they will succeed in
198. How to Harm Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/how-to-harm-investors.html.
199. Id.
200. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
70741, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200 et
seq.).
201. How to Harm Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/how-to-harm-investors.html; see also U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N
INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, RECOMMENDATION OF THE INVESTOR ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE: CROWDFUNDING REGULATIONS (2014) [hereinafter CROWDFUNDING RECOMMEN-
DATIONS], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/invest
ment-adviser-crowdfunding-recommendation.pdf.
202. Established by the Dodd-Frank Act to advise the SEC on regulatory priorities and
the protection of investor interests. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 911, 124 Stat. 1376, 1822 (2010).
203. CROWDFUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 201.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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achieving such objectives and promoting investor confidence in
crowdfunding, thereby increasing the diversity of funding available to
small businesses and social entrepreneurs in the market. This could unlock
a significantly larger pool of capital for social enterprises to access in the
long-term, regardless of entity structure.
V. CONCLUSION
It is an exciting time for the world of social enterprise and the role the
law and legal professionals can play in helping shape the space. Building
upon positives steps forward in terms of the evolution of hybrid legal
forms, relaxed securities regulations, and crowdsourcing, greater attention
must be dedicated toward creating a an enabling ecosystem for investment
in social enterprise. As stated by Cohen and Sahlman, “[i]f investors can
find the same courage the early institutional backers of the venture capital
industry found, we will see talented social entrepreneurs build large, effec-
tive organizations that move the needle on a social issue and deliver ac-
ceptable financial returns at the same time.”206 Further, just as the venture
capital industry incited a new approach to investing in innovation via the
funding of private sector startups, impact investment is increasingly pro-
viding opportunities for driving innovation for social benefit through en-
trepreneurial engagement and capital markets.207
Ultimately, academics, practitioners, and entrepreneurs alike must
share lessons learned and successful outcomes achieved by social ventures
and initiatives such as low-risk social impact bonds that generate returns.
This will facilitate the continued development of a more well-defined
space and rich interprofessional community around social enterprise.
Meanwhile, as the field grows and more successes are achieved through
innovative structuring and financing mechanisms, private investor confi-
dence will grow and so too will the capital accessible to social enterprise.
206. Cohen & Sahlman, supra note 15.
207. Id.
